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The "Ambiguity" Fallacy
Ryan D. Doerfler*
ABSTRACT
This Essay considers a popular, deceptively simple argument against the
lawfulness of Chevron. As it explains, the argument appears to trade on an
ambiguity in the term "ambiguity"-anddoes so in a way that reveals a mismatch between Chevron criticism and the larger jurisprudence of Chevron
critics.
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INTRODUCTION

Along with other, more complicated arguments, Chevron' critics
offer a simple inference. It starts with the premise, drawn from Marbury,2 that courts must interpret statutes independently. To this, critics
add, channeling James Madison, that interpreting statutes inevitably
requires courts to resolve statutory ambiguity. And from these two
seemingly uncontroversial premises, Chevron critics then infer that
deferring to an agency's resolution of some statutory ambiguity would
involve an abdication of the judicial role-after all, resolving statutory
ambiguity independently is what judges are supposed to do, and deference (as contrasted with respects) is the opposite of independence.
As this Essay explains, this simple inference appears fallacious
upon inspection. The reason is that a key term in the inference, "ambiguity," is critically ambiguous, and critics seem to slide between one
sense of "ambiguity" in the second premise of the argument and an*
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1 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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other in the conclusion. In other words, the charge is that Chevron
critics are committing the fallacy of equivocation.
Devoting an essay to a single inference might seem excessive, especially if, as is the case here, that argument is one among many.
There are, though, at least two reasons to attend carefully to this specific argument. The first is that, in contrast to the other arguments
against Chevron, which are based largely upon contestable, intellectual historical claims,4 the argument considered here is simple and intuitive, and, hence, more likely to persuade. Second and more
important, explaining the apparent fallacy reveals the mismatch between the modest law-identification conception of judging to which
Chevron critics generally adhere and the more interventionist conception needed to make the argument logically valid.

I.

THE ARGUMENT

While the argument at issue is suggested in various places, it is
articulated most explicitly and most clearly in two concurring opinions
by two of Chevron's most vocal critics. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass'n,5 Justice Thomas sets out his case against agency deference in a
sweeping concurrence. 6 In so doing, Justice Thomas draws extensively
on Founding-era history and, in particular, the scholarly work of
Philip Hamburger.7 Along the way, Justice Thomas also pieces together the inference described above, emphasizing again and again
the importance of judges exercising "independent judgment" when
making sense of the law. 8 Quoting Federalist 37, Justice Thomas then
adds that making sense of the law inevitably involves resolving ambiguity, for "[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical
skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal." 9 For this reason, Justice Thomas explains, "The judicial power was understood to include
the power to resolve these ambiguities over time."10 And from this,
Justice Thomas concludes that a "doctrine [that] demands that courts
accord 'controlling weight' to the agency interpretation" in situations
4 See infra note 7.

5 575 U.S. 92 (2015).
6 Id. at 112-33 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 120-21, 124-25 (citing
507-21 (2008)).
8 Id. at 119-26.
7

PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY

200-02,

9 Id. at 119 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961)).
10 Id.
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of ambiguity "amounts to a transfer of the judge's exercise of interpretive judgment to the agency."",
Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch,12 then-Judge Gorsuch argues that deferring to agency interpretations is fundamentally at odds with our separation of powers.1 3 Like
Justice Thomas, then-Judge Gorsuch insists upon the judicial duty "to
exercise . . . independent judgment about what the law is," invoking
Marbury.14 So too, then-Judge Gorsuch reasons that the duty to say
what the law is independently includes resolving statutory ambiguity
independently, explaining:
At Chevron step one, judges decide whether the statute is
"ambiguous," and at step two they decide whether the
agency's view is "reasonable." But where in all this does a
court interpretthe law and say what it is? When does a court
independently decide what the statute means and whether it
has or has not vested a legal right in a person? 5
Formalizing the argument, Justice Thomas and then-Judge Gorsuch thus appear to advance the following inference:
It is the role of the judiciary to interpret statutes independently;
Interpreting

statutes

inevitably

involves

resolving

statutory

ambiguity;
So, deferring to an agency's resolution of statutory ambiguity
would be an abdication of the judicial role.

II.

THE AMBIGUITY OF "AMBIGUITY"

The inference above is appealing in that its form is simple, its
premises seem obvious, and yet it delivers a legally significant conclusion. It is, as a result, more difficult to shrug off than, say, pure intellectual historical arguments, to which one might respond either 'Are
you sure?' or 'Who cares?' So what to say in response?
The argument's first premise is relatively settled within our legal
system, and, for that reason, this Essay treats it as true. Moving on to
the second premise and the conclusion, both include critical reference
to statutory "ambiguity." The worry, as this Part explains, is that the
term "ambiguity" is relevantly ambiguous, and it is not at all obvious
Id. at 123-24.
834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
13 See id. at 1150 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 1158.
'5 Id. at 1152.
11
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that "ambiguity" as used in the second premise means the same thing
as in the conclusion.16
In a weak sense, to say that some statutory provision is "ambiguous" is to claim that its meaning is non-obvious or difficult to know.
When courts talk about using legislative history to "clear up ambiguity," for example, the idea is that statutory meaning is not apparent
looking just at the text, but that viewing text and legislative history
together makes it so.' 7 Similarly, when courts say that attending to
other parts of the statute "eliminates . . . ambiguity" in the operative
term or phrase, the idea is that this additional evidence reveals statutory meaning that was previously hidden.18
By contrast, to say that a statute is "ambiguous" in a strong sense
is to claim that its meaning is not just difficult to know, but unknowable. In applying the rule of lenity, for example, courts resolve statutory "ambiguity" in favor of criminal defendants "only if, 'after seizing
everything from which aid can be derived,' [they] can make 'no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended."1 9 In other words, only if
statutory meaning remains uncertain after considering all available evidence does a provision count as "ambiguous" for lenity purposes. Or
consider, by analogy, the rule of contra proferentem in contracts.
Under that rule, juries are supposed to resolve contractual "ambiguities . . . against the drafter of the contract." 20 At the same time, "this
rule is only to be applied if all conventional means of contract interpretation, including the consideration of relevant extrinsic evidence, have
left the jury unable to determine what the parties intended their contract to mean." 21 Here again, we see that a contract is "ambiguous"
under contra proferentem only if contractual meaning is still a mystery
after considering every possible clue.
It is worth noting, doctrines like the rule of lenity that are triggered by statutory "ambiguity" in the strong sense are thus not tools
for discovering or identifying statutory meaning.22 Rather, they are de16 This ambiguity in the term "ambiguity" mirrors an ambiguity when courts talk about
"clear" statutory text. See generally Ryan D. Doerfler, Going "Clear" (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 720, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3326550

[https://perma.cc/K62K-FTW5].
17 See Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011).
18 See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997).
19 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (citations omitted) (quoting Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
20 Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 454 (Mich. 2003).
21 Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
22 See Doerfler, supra note 16 (manuscript at 12-16).
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fault rules that courts apply to decide statutory cases when statutory
meaning proves unknowable even after thorough investigation. By
contrast, when attending to nontextual sources like legislative history
as a way of resolving statutory "ambiguity" in the weak sense, courts
are attempting to figure out which meaning Congress intended.

III.

"AMBIGUITY" IN CHEVRON

Having identified the ambiguity in "ambiguity," the question then
becomes whether Chevron critics are using the term in the same sense
in both the second premise of the inference and the conclusion. If not,
of course, the argument fails, and those critics are committing the logical fallacy of equivocation.
Start with the conclusion. In Chevron itself, Justice Stevens famously wrote that courts are to defer to agencies only if the statute at
issue remains "ambiguous" after employing all the "traditional tools
of statutory construction."23 On its face, then, Chevron deference
seems triggered by statutory "ambiguity" in the strong sense. If statutory meaning is merely opaque at the outset, but by considering legislative history, statutory structure, or whatever else, a court is able to
"ascertain[ ] ... Congress['s] ... intention," then the role of that court
is simply to say what the law is.2 4 This reading of Chevron is bolstered
by Justice Stevens's characterization of what agencies do in the relevant cases as filling "gap[s] left open by Congress." 25
If, then, courts defer to agencies under Chevron only if statutory
meaning is unknowable, then "ambiguity" as used in Chevron critics'
conclusion must be heard in the strong sense. Otherwise, the conclusion would have no doctrinal relevance, because Chevron does not
instruct courts to defer if statutory meaning is merely difficult to
know.

IV.

RESOLVING "AMBIGUITY"

So, what about the second premise? Again, for the argument to
be logically valid, "ambiguity" as used in the second premise has to
have the same sense as "ambiguity" as used in the conclusion. And
because "ambiguity" as used in the conclusion has to be heard in the
strong sense, the same must be true of "ambiguity" as used in the
second premise.
23 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
24 Id.
25

Id. at 866; see also id. at 843-44 (reasoning that courts should understand congressional

"silen[ce]" as an implied delegation of authority to the agency).
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But here's the potential fallacy: there are various reasons to think
that Chevron critics are using "ambiguity" in the weak sense in stating
the second premise, or, at the very least, that the argument's intuitive
appeal depends upon audiences hearing it that way.
One reason to hear "ambiguity" as used in the second premise in
the weak sense is that, if heard in the strong sense, the premise is
much less obviously true. Heard in the weak sense, the second premise states merely that courts are tasked with making sense of statutes
that are difficult to parse. No one thinks that all statutory cases are
easy. To the contrary, courts very often must appeal to statutory structure, apparent purpose, and other contextual cues to determine what
Congress meant with the words that it used. In other words, courts
sometimes must put in serious work to discover or identify statutory
meaning. Again, this comes as news to no one.
In contrast, hearing "ambiguity" in the strong sense, the second
premise amounts to a much bolder and much more controversial
claim that courts inevitably must decide how to proceed in cases in
which statutory meaning proves unknowable. In other words, even if
courts are not sure what the law is, they must nevertheless render
judgment by "filling in the gaps," as it were.
As for reasons to doubt that much bolder claim, Chevron critics
again ground the second premise partially in Madison's statement in
Federalist 37 that the "meaning" of "obscure and equivocal" statutes
must be "liquidated and ascertained" over time.2 6 Concededly, one
can-and some have-interpreted Madison as saying that post-enactment practice can, in limited circumstances, make law. 27 On that reading, Madison envisioned courts and other actors engaging in
interstitial lawmaking through the setting of precedent, producing unwritten law in those areas where the meaning of written law is
unclear.2 8
There is, however, a more modest way of reading Federalist 37.
First and most obvious, Madison's talk of "ascertain[ing]" the meaning of written laws over time fits much more neatly with a conception
of judging as discovering the law as opposed to creating it. Indeed, the
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961).
27 See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2019).
28 See id. ("On Madison's model, the people had already provided a set of direct rules for
26

governance in the clear text of the Constitution . . . . Interstitial interpretations or questions left
unresolved by the text could be answered by any officer into whose jurisdiction they fell. But
those answers would become binding constitutional law-that is, would become liquidatedonly once indirectly endorsed by the people who had the authority to promulgate binding constitutional norms in the first place.").
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relevant portion of Federalist 37 mentions repeatedly the imprecision
of language, implying that the role of a court is to identify the idea a
law's drafter was attempting to communicate, however imperfectly.29
Madison's reference to "liquidat[ion]" can be read the same way-on
one standard usage, to "liquidate" is to make "clear" or "plain,"30
which is consistent with, but, does not necessarily compel, a discovery
conception of judging. More still, even if one hears "liquidat[ion]" as
referring more ambitiously to "settlement," 3' Madison is very plausibly expressing the thought that postenactment practice would determine, practically speaking, what norms would prevail in areas
ungoverned by written law. In the separation of powers context, for
example, the concept of "liquidation" is sometimes invoked to explain
why post-enactment political branch practice settles questions unanswered by constitutional text. 32 In those situations, however, it is plausible to understand political branch practice as settling not a legal, but
a political question, establishing a convention that supplements law.
Settling which is the best understanding of Federalist 37 goes beyond the scope of this Essay. The only claim here is that the correct
reading of Madison is contestable.
Madison aside, the strong reading of the second premise is independently dubious. Again, the thought that Chevron critics seem to
express is that judges cannot help but resolve statutory "ambiguities"
in the course of deciding statutory cases. And in a close statutory case,
one might think that absent some default rule like Chevron or the rule
of lenity, a court would be forced to declare some reading of the statute "best" even if that reading were less than "clear." In so doing, that
court would, seemingly, be resolving "ambiguity" in the strong sense,
in effect deciding what the statute now means-after all, by the court's
own lights, Congress's intended meaning remains less than clear,
which is to say, uncertain.
Attractive as this 'there are no ties in statutory cases' rationale
might seem, it is, upon reflection, mistaken. As Judge Easterbrook
argued decades ago, there is a way for courts to dispense with statu29 See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 26, at 236-37 (James Madison).
30 Baude, supra note 27, at 12.
31

Id.

32 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) ("We recognize, of course, that the
separation of powers can serve to safeguard individual liberty, and that it is the 'duty of the
judicial department'-in a separation-of-powers case as in any other-'to say what the law is.'
But it is equally true that the longstanding 'practice of the government' can inform our determination of 'what the law is."' (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)

137, 177 (1803); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819))).
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tory cases without saying what the law is, namely by declaring that
there is no identifiable law to apply.33 In a statutory case, like any
other, the moving party asks for a court to intervene. Assuming a
court in a statutory case is supposed to identify, rather than create, the
applicable law, it stands to reason that courts are justified in intervening only if there is applicable law to be identified. In other words, if
the role of a court is to say what the law is in a statutory case, a court
should intervene in some case only if it knows the answer to the question presented, which is to say, only if the law is "clear." 34 If, in turn, a
court finds itself unable to answer the question presented without
qualification, it can simply decline to intervene. In so doing, the court
would leave the status quo unchanged, resolving the case, in effect, on
jurisdictional grounds.
Again, settling whether Judge Easterbrook was right about what
courts should do in the absence of "clear" statutory meaning is not the
aim of this Essay. Instead, the point is that there are, seemingly, ways
for courts to resolve statutory cases other than declaring that statutes
mean this or that.

V.

JUDGES AS UMPIRES

Regardless of whether courts must, in fact, resolve statutory "ambiguity" in the strong sense, it would be an odd claim for Chevron
critics to make. Generally speaking, such critics skew formalist as to
separation of powers, emphasizing the qualitative difference between
judging and legislating. In his concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela, for
example, then-Judge Gorsuch explained the importance of judicial independence by contrasting our "avowedly political legislature" with
the judiciary, composed of "individuals insulated from political pressures." 35 As then-Judge Gorsuch continued, being so insulated is what
permits the judiciary to act as "neutral decisionmakers who will apply
the law as it is, not as they wish it to be." 36
In telling this story, then-Judge Gorsuch was very obviously offering a picture of judging as law identification or discovery as opposed
to lawmaking. The same was true of Chief Justice Roberts when he
infamously remarked, "Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make
33 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 535 (1983).
34 Absent knowledge of the law, a court could only guess or opine as to its content. See

Timothy Williamson, Knowing and Asserting, 105

PHIL. REV.

489, 492 (1996) (arguing that it is

appropriate to assert something without condition only if one knows

it

to be true).

35 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
36

Id.
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the rules; they apply them." 37 Or consider Justice Thomas, who
opined, "federal courts interpret, rather than author, the federal ...
code. "38

Chief Justice Roberts's comments, in particular, were widely
mocked. 39 Much of that response was owed to the obvious mismatch
between the image of judges as "calling balls and strikes" and observable judicial behavior.40 Thus, insofar as Chief Justice Roberts intended his remarks as an accurate descriptive account, the subsequent
ridicule was basically justified.
Still, as an ideal, judging as law identification has a lot going for it.
Varying slightly then-Judge Gorsuch's reasoning, that ideal helps to
make sense of our insulating judges from political pressures. If judges
were intended to be lawmakers, after all, it would be hard to explain
not holding them to democratic account, whether directly or indirectly. Assuming, though, that courts are supposed to be apolitical,
insulation from politics makes perfect sense.
More fundamentally, that claims of "politicization" even register
as criticism suggests broad acceptance of the law identification ideal. It
makes no sense to complain that some legislator acted on his or her
best policy judgment. Nor is it especially disturbing that members of
Congress vote predictably according to party affiliation. By contrast,
as Lee Epstein and Eric Posner remark, for the judiciary to "sustain
public confidence," it must not be seen as "rigidly divided by both
ideology and party." 41 And while much of legal scholarship goes to
demonstrating courts' actual division along ideological and partisan
37

ConfirmationHearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of

the United States: HearingBefore the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they
apply them... . They make sure everybody plays by the rules .... [A]nd I will remember that it's
my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.").

38 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2001).
39 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, This Court Erred, SLATE (Sept. 30, 2014, 2:36 PM) https://
slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/09/the-case-against-the-supreme-court-erwin-chemerinskysays-justices-side-with-powerful-and-privileged.html

[https://perma.cc/GD7Z-UXCB]

(quoting

Erwin Chemerinsky as saying, "[The analogy] is a grossly inaccurate description of what Supreme Court justices do. Supreme Court justices do not simply call balls and strikes. They determine the rules and the strike zone.").
40

See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, Supreme Court Justices' Loyalty to the Presi-

dent, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 401 (2016) ( [J]ustices more frequently vote for the government
when the president who appointed them is in office than when subsequent presidents lead the
government.").
41

Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, Opinion, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can it

Be Just?, N.Y.

TIMES

(July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-

nominee-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5D6H-6M7C].
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grounds, that those findings are at all disturbing suggests an ideal of
judging as fundamentally different from legislating-an ideal, again,
adhered to by the public at large.
Last, looking at courts themselves, judicial discourse reflects a
firm, bipartisan commitment to law identification. Judges are, for example, unwilling to openly deviate from "clear" statutory or constitutional text. 42 And even in cases in which courts acknowledge that text
is opaque, the adopted reading is characterized systematically as "better" as a matter of interpretive accuracy as opposed to policy wisdom. 43 Needless to say, courts can and do deviate from statutory orespecially-constitutional text, 44 and when they do, it very often
seems to be on political grounds. Still, that courts refuse to do so unabashedly amounts to an implicit recognition that judicial policymaking is out of bounds.
Commitment to law identification is thus a serious advantage for
formalists-e.g., textualists, originalists-in the broader debate versus
functionalists-e.g., purposivists, living constitutionalists. In terms of
public acceptance, the picture of judges as "umpires" is both simple
and attractive. 45 And even for academics or other elites, that judges
are unwilling to openly reject that picture is a serious impediment for
those wanting to reject formalism outright.
Coming back to Chevron, its critics' association with formalism
and law identification matters for a couple of reasons. First, whatever
those critics might intend, being so strongly tied to law identification
makes it more or less inevitable that audiences will hear the second
premise-that interpreting statutes inevitably involves resolving ambiguity-as about "ambiguity" in the weak sense. Again, to say that
judges inevitably resolve statutory "ambiguity" in the strong sense is
to claim that judges cannot help but legislate from the bench. For individuals who analogize judges to umpires, that would be an odd claim

42 See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2373-74 (2015)
(constitutional); Doerfler, supra note 16 (manuscript at 3) (statutory).

43 See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 41 (2008)
("While both sides present credible interpretations of [the statute], Florida has the better one. To
be sure, Congress could have used more precise language ...

and thus removed all ambiguity.

But the two readings of the language that Congress chose are not equally plausible .... ").
44 See David A. Strauss, Foreword:Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) ("If we read the text of the Constitution in a straightforward way, American
constitutional law 'contradicts' the text of the Constitution more often than one might think.").
45 There is a reason, after all, that Chief Justice Roberts used this analogy in his public
confirmation hearings.

1120

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1110

to make. Charity would thus seem to compel the weak reading, letting
the audience avoid any impression of inconsistency.
Second, insofar as the strong reading of the second premise involves a step away from law identification, critics of Chevron really
ought to ask whether that step is worth taking. Again, the commitment to law identification is one of the best things that formalism has
going for it. Being able to say that courts should "apply the law as it is,
not as they wish it to be"46 is an important rhetorical advantage, and
one that formalists should be reluctant to give away. Thus, if the price
of making the argument against Chevron logically valid is having to
say that "of course judges make law," Chevron's formalist critics
would do well to reconsider.
CONCLUSION

Needless to say, the claim here is not that the inference in question is the first or most pressing instance in which formalist judges risk
deviating from the law identification ideal. Instead, the point of this
Essay is merely to show that what might seem like a simple argument
against Chevron is surprisingly complicated, and, moreover, that what
makes it complicated should give Chevron critics reason for pause.

46 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).

